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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by plaintiff respondent,
Management Services Corporation (hereinafter "f.lanagement
Services"), Purchaser, against Development Associates, Seller,
for the breach of a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
December 7, 1976 (hereinafter "the Contract"), wherein
Management Development Associates agreed to sell to Management
Services eight (8) improved lots in the Daybreak Phase III
Subdivision for a total price of Eighty Thousand Dollars
($80,000), calculated at Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000) per
lot.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried May 31, 1978, before the Honorable
Peter F. Leary, of the Third Judicial District Court, who sat
without a jury.

The trial court, after having received and

considered the evidence and memoranda submitted by the parties,
found that the Contract was divisible;

that respondent

defaulted with respect to the purchase of the first two lots by
not making payment therefor in March of 1977 and thereby
forfeited all of its right, title, and interest in the two
lots; and that appellant wrongfully terminated the Contract
with respect to the remaining six (6) lots which were to be
paid in full by respondent in April, May, and June of 1977.
Accordingly, on February 1, 1979, the trial court entered
judgment dismissing the quiet title claim of plaintiff
respondent, but awarding it, as damages for defendant-
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appellant's breach of contract, the amount of Seven Thousand,
Seven Hundred Dollars ($7,700) in lost profits, Two Thousand,
Four Hundred Thirty-Eight Dollars ($2,438) for lost
commissions, Six Hundred Dollars ($600) for the deposit
wrongfully retained by Defendant, costs of One Hundred
Fifty-Nine Dollars and Five Cents ($159.05) and attorney's fees
of One Thousand, Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,850) for a
total judgment of Twelve Thousand, Seven Hundred Forty-Seven
Dollars and Five Cents ($12,747.05) with interest at the rate
of Eight Percent (8%).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Management Services, asks this Court to affirm
the judgment of the trial court and issue an order to the trial
court directing it to determine and award to respondent its
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee,
incurred in connection with this appeal.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Respondent accepts the appellant's Statement of Material
Facts, as supplemented by the information that follows:
The Uniform Real Estate Contract executed on December 7,
1976 by Development Associates and Management Services was
prepared by Development Associates. (R. at 134, 135).

The same

day the contract was executed, an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase was executed by Edward A.

White for

Management Services as Purchaser, and by Marvin J. Kirkham, for
Development Associates, as Seller, of Lots 208 and No. 212 of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Phase II of the same Daybreak Subdivision wherein were located
the eight (8) lots of the Contract at issue. (R. at 1]3).
Subsequently, the sale of those two apparently noncontiguous
lots to Management Services was closed and the lots were
transferred by Management Services to Red Carpet Construction.
(R.

at 228, 128).
Mr. Kirkham of Development Associates had brought great

experience to his negotiations with Mr. White of Management
Services Mr. Kirkham had graduated from college with a degree
in business management, had attended one (1) year of law
school, had worked for several years as a real estate

age~t,

and later as a broker, and had been involved in five or six
hundred transactions where either the Uniform Real Estate
Contract form or an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
form was used. (R. at 239-+2).
The consideration for the eight (8) lots named in the
Contract was calculated on the basis of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000) per lot.

(R. at 129).

The deposit on the Contract

was likewise calculated at One Hundred Dollars ($100) per lot
for a total of Eight Hundred Dollars ($800).

(R. at 265).

Separate warranty deeds were to be issued by Development
Associates for each lot as it was paid for.

(R. at 266).

The eight (8) lots named in the Contract were encumbered by
a mortgage in favor of State Savings

& Loan

and by an

obligation of approximately Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) per
lot in favor of Land Funding, Inc., the party from which
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Development Associates was purchasing the property. (R. at
268)

As Management Services paid for each lot, Development

Associates intended to transfer money to State Savinqs

& Loan

and to Land Funding, Inc., satisfying the obligations owed
those parties, and thereby procure a release from those parties
of each lot on a lot by lot basis. (R. at 268).
Paragraph 21 of the Contract provides for the defaulting
party to pay "all costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this
. or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder

agreement,

or by the statutes of

t~e

State of Utah whether such remedy is

pursued by filing a suit or otherwise."

(R. at 10).

ARGUMENT
Point
THE PARTIES INTENDED THE CONTRACT
TO BE SEVERABLE
The only issue raised by appellant on this appeal is the
correctness of the trial court's determination that the
Contract is divisible or severable.

In this situation, it is

elementary that:
(o)n appeal the evidence is viewed in
the light most favorable to sustain the
lower court, and the findings will not
be disturbed unless they are clearly
against the weight of the evidence or
it manifestly appears that the court
misapplied the law to the established
facts. ( Citations ami tted).
Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah Zd 251, 495 P.Zd 28, 29-30 (1972).
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Admittedly, this Court has every advantage a trial court
has in construing an instrument from its written terms.
Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221, 223
(1958).

However, where a document is ambiguous, as the instant

Contract will shortly be shown to be, thus opening the door to
extraneous explanation, it is appropriate to defer to the
findings of the trial court.
The fact that the trial court found against the appellant
on the severability issue accords with the well-established
principle that an ambiguous document is to be "strictly
construed against him who draws it."
440, 354 P.Zd 121, 123 (1960).

Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 2d

The fact that a form contract

was used in the instant case does not militate otherwise where,
as here, the use of that form was suggested by the appellant
who had opportunity to modify or make additions to the form as
he saw fit.

(R. at 265-66).

As this case demands construction of the Contract at issue,
standard principles of contract construction apply.
The most fundamental of these is that
the meaning and effect to be given a
contract depends upon the intent of the
parties.
Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah
2d 187, 515 P.2d 446, 448 (1973)

citin~

Jensen's Used Cars v.

Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1959).
Clearly, if the parties had agreed at the outset on the
issue whether the transaction were to be severable and if the
parties had plainly expressed that intent in the Contract,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization- provided
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th~

matter would be closed.

As the Contract is silent on that

precise issue, an ambiguity arises.

The fact of that ambiguity

is substantiated by appellant's recourse to testimony at trial
and to other matters outside the language of the Contract for
support for appellant's position. (Brief of Appellant at
ll-14).

Appellant's attempt at disclaimer with the phrase "the
language of the contract speaks for itself" (Brief of Appellant
at 10) is conclusory and self serving.

The only relevant

contract language is contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. (R. at
9).

Paragraph 2 designates the eight (8) lots to be conveyed by

naming them, one by one.

Paragraph 3 specifies that, as

consideration for those lots, the sum of Eighty Thousand Dollars
($80,000) is to be paid, Eight Hundred Dollars ($800) down and
the remaining Seventy Nine Thousand Two Hundred Dollars
($79,200) in four (4) equal installments of an amount precisely
calculated to complete payment on two (2) lots at a time.
Paragraph 6 states that the property to be conveyed is
encumbered by obligations amounting to "Eight Thousand, Six
Hundred Dollars ($8,600) per lot."

These provisions just cited

contain no clear expression of the intent of the parties on the
issue of the Contract's severability.

However, one desiring to

make inferences therefrom is struck by the divisible nature of
both the property being conveyed and the consideration to be
exchanged therefor and by the pairing of the installment
payments with the closing on two lots per month.

The silence of

- 6- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Contract on the severability issue also raises the
possibility that the parties may not have even thought about
severability, let alone arriving at a mutual understanding
thereon and reducing it to writing.
In any case, the ambiguity of the Contract begets the
necessity of resort to extraneous evidence on the issue whether
the parties intended the Contract to be severable, or, short of
that, on what the parties would have agreed upon had they
thought about the matter.

In the words of this Court

. The parties 1 intent
. is
derived from looking at the entire
contract and the relationship of the
parts to the whole and whether it was
intended that the total agreement be
severable.
In exploring a contract on this issue,
the factfinder
may and should
look to extraneous evidence concerning
the background and surrounding
circumstances in order to make that
determination.
1

•

•

Brown v. Board of Education of Morgan County School Dist., 560
P.Zd 1129, 1131 (Utah 1977) quoting Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc.
v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., supra, 515 P.Zd at 448.

Point II
THE CONTRACT AS A MATTER OF LAW
IS SEVERABLE
An analysis of the evidence extraneous to the Contract
shows that the Contract is divisible under any appropriate
legal standard of severability.

Those standards must be

examined before proceeding to a consideration of the evidence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Two main tests of severability emerge from the reported
cases and treatises.

The first test, the "apportionability

test," looks to whether the consideration for the Contract may
be apportioned to distinct acts to be performed under the
Contract.

The second test, "the essence of the contract,"

seeks an answer to the question whether the Contract would have
been entered into at all if a part alleged to be divisible had
not been made a part of the original bargain.
Perhaps the most succinct formulation of the
apportionability test is that given by the Idaho Supreme Court
in Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms, 75 Idaho. 436, 273 P.Zd
399, at 406 (1954):
Where several things are to be done
under a contract, and if the money
consideration to be paid is apportioned
to each item, the covenants are
severable and independent. (Citations
omitted).
In Huggins, the plaintiffs contracted to sell the defendant
the real and personal property of the Huggins dairy.

A price

was agreed upon for the real property and most of the personal
property, to be paid in installments.

The remaining items,

inventory, accounts receivable, and similar things, were to be
paid for in a sum to be later determined by procedure and
methods provided for in the contract.

After defendant missed

three installment payments, the plaintiffs served the defendant
a written notice claiming that defendant had defaulted in the
payment of the installments missed and that defendant had
failed to pay a specified amount allegedly due for the accounts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
8Library Services and Technology Act, -administered
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receivable and inventory.
possession of the property.

By this notice, plaintiffs demanded
Defendant

tende~ed

the amount

claimed due for the installment payments, but refused to tender
anything for the accounts receivable or inventory, claiming
that the price of those items was an unliquidated amount.

This

tender was wrongfully refused, and plaintiffs instituted suit
for recission of the contract and for the appointment of a
receiver to operate the dairy.

On appeal from the trial

court's decision granting the relief requested, the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had wrongfully refused
the tender of the missed installment payments and that even
assuming the defendant was in default for the amount allegedly
due for the accounts receivable and inventory, that part of the
contract was severable as a separate consideration was
apportioned to those items and default in the payment for those
items would not justify recission of the rest of the contract.
Another formulation of the apportionability test was given
by the Nevada Supreme Court in Dredge Corporation v. Wells
Cargo, Inc., 82 Nev. 69, 410 P.Zd 751, 754 (1966) as follows:
A contract is divisible where, by its
terms, performance of each party is
divided into two or more parts; the
number of parts due from each party is
the same; and the performance of each
part is the agreed exchange for a
corresponding part by the other party.
In that case, Wells, a gravel business operator, contracted
to improve and perform the annual assessment work on numerous
unpatented mining claims owned by Dredge.

In return, the
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contract obligated Dredge to convey to Wells an undivided
one-half interest in each claim "when patents have been issued
on any of said claims."

Wells gave the agreed performance on

many of the mining claims, but not on the remaining claims for
various reasons.

After patents were issued to Dredge on

several of the improved claims, Dredge refused to convey the
promises interest to Wells on the ground that Wells had failed
to perform its contractual obligations on all claims on which
patents had not been issued.

Wells filed suit against Dredge

for specific performance of the promises to convey an undivided
one half interest in the patented claims and for a partition.
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld that ruling of the trial court
that the contract was divisible as to each mining claim even in
the face of a contract cancellation clause which provided that,
if Wells failed to perform "any condition, covenant, term, or
agreement herein, at the time and in the manner herein set
forth after five (5) days' written notice of such failure, then
this agreement is automatically cancelled

The state

supreme court held that this clause was compatible with a
divisible contract and granted specific performance of the
covenant to convey the undivided one-half interest in each
patented claim as to which Wells had fully performed.
In the instant case, the performance of each party was
div1ded into several discreet acts, each of which was the
agreed exchange for a corresponding counterperformance of the
other party.

Upon receipt of the $800 deposit of respondent,
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appellant covenanted to hold the lots in question for the
respondent until the times specified in the contract had
expired and to not convey or offer to convey the lots to any
other party until after those dates had passed.

As each

installment payment of $19,800 was made, the sale of two lots
was to be closed and the lots conveyed to respondent.

Indeed,

the emphasis of the brief of appellant on the importance of the
alleged intention of the parties to the exclusion of other
factors concedes the facts that this Contract meets the
requirements of the apportionability test of severability.
The second test of divisibility of a contract, the essence
of the contract test, has also been variously stated.

An

oft-quoted formulation of that test is that of the Arizona
Supreme Court in Waddell v. White, 51 Ariz. 526, 78 P.Zd 490,
496 (1938) where the Court stated:

A contract may both in its nature and
by its terms be severable, and yet
rendered entire by the intention of the
parties. We think that perhaps the
best test is whether all of the things,
as a whole, are of the essence of the
contract. That is, if it appeared that
the purpose was to take the whole or
none, then the contract would be
entire; otherwise, it would be
severable.
This test has been formulated by Williston in the following
terms:
The essential test to determine whether
a number of promises constitute one
contract or more than one, is simple.
It can be nothing else than the answer
to an inquiry whether the parties
assented to all the promises as a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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single whole, so that there would have
been no bargain whatever, if any
promise or set of promises were struck
out.
Williston on Contracts, Vol. II, p. 1652; Rev.Ed. Vol. III, p.
2422, as quoted in Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68
Id. 506, 201 P.2d 976, 980 (1948).
The view taken by cases adopting the essence of the
contract test is that the court will consider as an important,
but not the determinative, factor, if applicable, the
divisibility of the subject matter of the contract and the
apportionability of the consideration.

If the contract meets

the requirements of this divisibility or apportionability test,
the contract is considered prima facie severable.

The essence

of the contract test is then applied to settle the issue. See,
~·

Waddell v. White, supra; Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho.

337, 339 P.2d 635 (1965).
Applying the essence of the contract test to the instant
case, there is little doubt that the parties would have
contracted for the sale of less than eight lots.

There is the

fact that the same day the contract was executed, the same
parties signed an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
for two other lots in a different phase of the same subdivision
containing the eight lots to be conveyed under the contract.
The sale of the two lots in Phase II of the Daybreak
Subdivision was later closed by respondent with appellant and
title to the lots was eventually passed to the designee of
respondent, Red Carpet Construction. (R. at 128, ZOO).

This
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transaction evidences the apparent willingness of appellant to
sell to respondent as many (or as few)· lots as ·respondent
desired to purchase.
Appellant's willingness to sell the eight lots in Phase III
as separate parcels is shown even more conclusively by the fact
that after appellant wrongfully forfeited respondent's interest
in six of the eight lots, appellant sold those same eight lots
to seven different parties.

(R. at 236-37).

The fact that the encumbrances on the Phase III lots could
be removed "on a lot release basis" only substantiates this
point of view. (R. at 268).

Nor is a different conclusion

indicated by the trial testimony of Mr. Kirkham, appellant's
agent, when he stated:

"As each lot was paid for and cleared

we would issue a warranty deed."

(R. at 266).

Appellant, in its brief, attempts to make much of the fact
that the total consideration for the conveyance of the eight
lots under the contract was $80,000, in an attempt to imply
that a contract for the sale of fewer lots and a
correspondingly smaller amount of money would not have been
entered into.

That reasoning does not withstand analysis.

A

consideration expressed in terms of money is the most divisible
consideration possible.

It is the very divisibility of money

that has enabled it to supplant barter as a means of trade.
The use of the phrase "total payment" in reference to the
$80,000 consideration (R. at 266) does not help appellant as
linguistically, the use of the word "total" in such a context
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implies that the speaker had in mind the sum of several
separate items.

The fact that the parties allocated the sum of

$19,800 "to complete payment on two (2) lots" at a time
completes the destruction of any argument based on the
specification of the consideration for an intent to sell all
eight lots as a group or none at all.
The conclusion that the parties had no intent to contract
for all eight lots or none at all is buttressed by the fact
that appellant knew from the outset that respondent would
merely be reconveying the lots to other and various parties.
(R. at 256).

Thus, appellant would have had no expectation

that might have justified a sale of not less than all eight
lots to respondent such as might have been the case if
respondent were a builder who had planned to impose a uniform
scheme of construction on all eight lots.
The conclusion is inescapable that the only reason for
listing all eight lots under the one contract was appellant's
apparent perception that it had a willing buyer for the lots
who could provide appellant with the money it desired out of
the project sooner than anyone else.

That desire of appellant

to receive its money out of the development is entirely
consistent with an intent to sell any number of lots, either
eight or fewer than eight, that any prospective purchaser would
he willing to buy.
Respondent concedes that under the contract it could take
tltle to any two of the eight lots to be conveyed upon tender
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uf the proper payment therefor.
render the contract entire.

However, that fact does not

It simply does not follow from

paragraph 19 of the contract, as appellant

asser~s

at p. 13 of

its brief, that if the parties had agreed beforehand as to the
order in which the lots were to be conveyed upon receipt of
proper payment therefor, title to all eight lots would have
remained in Development Associates.

Indeed, respondent fails

to see how any specification of the order in which the lots
were to be conveyed or lack thereof would affect appellant's
obligation under paragraph 19 to transfer a warranty deed on
each lot to respondent upon its tender of proper payment as
appellant's agent testified at trial it was obligated to do.
(R. at 266).
Furthermore, appellant's attempted use of the judgment
phrase "the first two lots" to imply that the court erred
(Brief of Appellant at 12-13) gives to that language a meaning
unnatural for its context and additionally is irrelevant to the
question of the intent of the parties.

The trial court's use

of the quoted phrase was simply meant to convey the idea that
respondent defaulted with respect to the purchase of the first
two lots it claimed a right to in March, 1977 under the
allowance of choice given the respondent by the contract and
did not in the least intend to convey the idea that any order,
either that in which the lots were listed on the contract or
any other, had been imposed upon respondent restricting it to
take certain lots only at designated times.
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Rather than imposing "upon the parties a contract to which
they would not have assented," as appellant asserts in its
brief at 14, the trial court in this case simply found, as it
was obligated to do on the facts before it, that the contract
at issue is divisible and "established separate obligations and
responsibilities between plaintiff and defendant."
99).

(R. at

This conclusion of law was not the result of a

misapplication of the appropriate legal standards to the facts
before the court.

The divisible nature of the contract's

subject matter, and its apportionment of the considerations on
each side into equivalent and corresponding parts, meet the
requirements of the apportionability test and this contract is
prima facie severable.

Nothing appearing in the record to

justify the conclusion that the parties intended to contract
for all or nothing, the court could do no other than declare
the severability of the contract absolute.

To quote the

Supreme Court of California
The rule is well settled that where
several things are to be done under a
contract, if the money consideration to
be paid is apportioned to each of the
items to be performed, the covenants
are ordinarily regarded as severable
and independent.
(Citation omitted)
The argument that the court cannot
apportion because the parties did not
expressly apportion is without merit.
That argument exalts form over
substance.
Keene v. Harling, 61 Cal.Zd 318, 38 Ca1.Rptr. 513, 392 P.Zd
273, 277 (1964).
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As this court has acknowledged in Prudential Savings
Association v. Hartford Accident

& Indemnity

& Loan

Co., 7 Utah Zd

366, 325 P.Zd 899, 903 (1958):
(I)t is a recognized principle of
contract law that a breach of an
insubstantial nature, which is
severable and does not vitally change
the transaction, does not release the
other party completely from performing
his obligations under the contract, but
gives rise to a right for damages for
any loss occasioned thereby. (Footnote
omitted).
All legal standards of severability having been met by the
facts of this case, this Court should affirm the judgment of
the trial court awarding respondent the damages it suffered as
a result of appellant's wrongful termination as to six of the
eight lots to be conveyed under the contract.

POINT III
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS COSTS AND
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR SUCCESSFULLY
RESISTING THE INSTANT APPEAL.
The contract between the parties to this suit contains the
following language at paragraph 21 on the payment of attorney's
fees:
The Buyer and Seller each agree that
should they default in any of the
covenants or agreements contained
herein, that the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expenses, including a
reasonable attorney's fee, which may
arise or accrue from enforcing this
agreement, or in obtaining possession
of the premises covered hereby, or in
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder
or by the statutes of the State of Utah
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whether such remedy is pursued by
filing a suit or otherwise. (R. at 10)
Respondent respectfully requests that this Court enforce
this contractual provision by issuing an order directing the
trial court to award to respondent the amount incurred by it
for reasonable attorney's fees in successfully resisting this
appeal.
This Court has stated that "Attorneys' fees on appeal are
discretionary with this court
Real Estate
(1955).

& Investment

Swain v. Salt Lake

Co., 3 Utah Zd 121, 279 P.Zd 709, 711

Admittedly, the facts in Swain which involved an

action for forfeiture under a Uniform Real Estate Contract
which was successfully defended against at trial and the result
was upheld on appeal, are similar to the instant case.
However, in Swain the parties stipulated that $250 would be a
reasonable attorney fee for either party.

After finding that

the Swain action was one to enforce the contract, this Court
construed the stipulation to cover services rendered also on
appeal.

Accordingly, the prevailing party in that case was

awarded the amount specified in the stipulation for attorneys'
fees.
In the instant case, appellant has taken this appeal
arguing, in essence, only that the legal standard of
severability, as to which standard there is no disagreement,
was not properly applied to the facts.

Having been put to the

necessity by this appeal of showing that the judgment of the
trial court soundly applied the facts of the instant case to
- l g-
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the proper legal standard, the respondent, under any reasonable
view of how this Court ought to exercise its discretionary
power, is entitled to be reimbursed for attorney's fees
incurred by it in connection with this appeal.

As the parties

have made no stipulation as to what a reasonable attorney's fee
would be for the trial of this case with an appeal, thus
distinguishing it from Swain, and as the record clearly shows
that the amount awarded respondent for attorney's fees at the
trial below was only for services rendered up to and including
the day of that trial (R. at 274), respondent should be awarded
an additional amount to compensate it for fees incurred as a
result of this appeal.
The only other Utah case to expressly articulate this rule
of discretion contains additional qualifying language that is
disturbing to respondent is Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney
~.

556 P.Zd 1273 (Utah 1976).

After citing Swain for the

proposition that attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary
with this Court,

the opinion adds "and then only when

specifically authorized by statute or rule of court."
1275.

Id. at

As authority for that qualification, the opinion cites

first of all Marks v. Culmer, 7 Utah 163, 25 P. 743 (l891).

At

issue there was the allowability of certain items included by
defendants in a list of costs incurred on a previous appeal
wherein the court had given the defendants their costs.
Reasoning by analogy from a federal statute (the court was then
a territorial court) which provided for the allowance of an

- 19-
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attorney fee of $20 on a trial before a jury, which statute was
construed by the Utah court to apply only to the trial in the
nisi prius courts, the Marks opinion held that an attorney's
fee could not be included as part of the costs awarded
defendant after stating "as to the item charged as 'attorney
fee,' we know of no law authorizing its allowance for trials in
this court on appeal."

_!i., 26 P. at 744.

The Marks opinion

stands only for the proposition that attorney's fees are not
costs, and are not to be awarded to a successful party who
receives an award of costs without explicit mention of
attorney's fees.
The second authority cited in support of the qualifying
language in Downey State Bank was Keller v. Lonsdale, 216 Or.
339, 339 P.Zd 112 (1959).

That was an action to foreclose the

interest of the defendants, the purchasers of ten coin-operated
television sets, under two conditional sales contracts.

The

defendants appealed from a trial court decree in favor of the
plaintiff which included an award to plaintiff of its
attorney's fees.

In affirming the trial court's opinion, the

Oregon court denied plaintiff's request for an allowance of a
reasonable sum for attorney's fees incurred on appeal stating
"in the absence of precedent, legislative sanction, or a
contractual stipulation contemplating such an allowance on
appeal, the request 1-1ill be denied."

~··

339 P.Zd at 118.

That case established the Oregon rule that attorney's fees on
appeal would not be awarded pursuant to a contractual provision
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for attorney's fees unless the contract specifically mentioned
attorney's fees on appeal in addition to attorney's fees
generally.

Though this judicial rule has been consistently

applied in Oregon, see,

~·

McMillan v. Golden, 262 Or. 317,

497 P.2d 1166 (1972), that jurisdiction is in a distinct
minority in holding to that view as will later be shown.
However, even this narrow interpretation applied in Oregon
recognizes the importance of enforcing a contractual provision
for attorney's fees.
The final authority cited in Downey State Bank in support
of the qualifying language therein set forth and the apparent
source of that qualifying language is 5 Am.Jur.Zd, Appeal and
Error,

1022.

That section includes the statement:
Attorneys' fees are taxable as costs on
appeal only when authorized by statute
or rule of court. Id. at p. 445.

This statement merely reiterates the position taken in Marks v.
Culmer that a party awarded its costs on appeal may not include
as a part thereof its attorney's fees for the appeal unless
expressly authorized to do so by statute or court rule or
order.

It does not detract from the view that a contractual

provision for attorney's fees should be enforced.
The rule of discretion previously announced by this court
has much to recommend itself as applied to suits in equity such
as divorce actions which actions seem to provide the most
frequent occasion for the award of attorney's fees on appeal.
See, Bates v. Bates, 560 P.Zd 706 (Utah 1977); Eastman v.
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Eastman, 558 P.Zd 514 (Utah 1976) and cases cited therein at
516 N. 3.

However, in cases where a cont.ractual provision for

attorney's fees is operative, respondent submits that this
court may forge a rule of law in awarding attorney's fees
incurred on appeal by the prevailing party as a matter of
course, thus lessening the burden on this Court of examining
the detailed circumstances of each such case to decide whether
the award would be appropriate.

Oregon has already done so to

a limited extent as explained above and virtually every other
Western jurisdiction to consider the matter in recent years has
adopted the rule that where a contract provides even generally
for the award of attorney's fees as a part of the expenses
incurred in enforcing the contract, the prevailing party on an
appeal is to receive its attorney's fees for that appeal
notwithstanding the lack of mention of an appeal in the
contract.

See, generally, the annotation at 52 A.L.R.Zd

863-874 and cases cited therein and in the later case service.
For example, the Supreme Court of California has ruled that
a party who successfully defends on appeal the correctness of a
lower court judgment in enforcing a contract is to be awarded
the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with that
appeal where the contract provides for a reasonable attorney's
fee "in case suit is instituted to collect this note."

Wilson

v. Wilson, 54 Cal.2d 264, 5 Cal.Rptr. 317, 352 P.2d 725, 731
(1960).

Subsequently, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the

same rule in Steele v. Vanderslice, 90 Ariz. 277, 367 P.Zd 636
(1961) and there stated, at 367 P.Zd 643:
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The more recent authorities considering
contracts which provide for attorneys'
fees have made allowances for
additional fees for the prosecution or
defense of an action in the appellate
courts. (Citations omitted).
Arizona has not only maintained that position, Amos Flight
Operations, Inc. v. Thunderbird Bank, 112 Ariz. 263, 540 P.2d
1244 (1975), but has extended the award of attorney's fees on
appeal to the prevailing party in any contested action arising
out of a contract, apparently even in the absence of
contractual language providing for attorney's fees generally.
Gressley v. Patterson Tillage

& Leveling,

Inc., 579 P.2d 1124

(Ariz. App. 1978).
Other jurisdictions adopting the rule which respondent
urges this court to adopt are set forth as follows:
Washington, Puget Sound Mutual Savings Bank v. Lillions, 50
Wash. 2d 799, 314 P.2d 935 (1957);
Idaho 544, 428 P.2d 50 (1967);

Idaho, Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91

New Mexico, Cabot v. First

National Bank of Santa Fe, 81 N.M. 795, 474 P.2d 478 (1970);
Colorado, Zambruk v. Perlmutter Third General Builders, Inc.,
510 P.2d 472 (Colo. App. 1973) approved in Hartman v. Freedman,
591 P.2d 1318 (Colo. 1979); and Montana, Hollinger v.
McMichael, 594 P.2d 1120 (Mont. 1979).
An insightful analysis of this issue was given by the
Appellate Court of Colorado in Zambruk v. Perlmutter,

supr~,

wherein the court stated, at 510 P.Zd 475-76:
The question presented is whether a
contractual provision for attorney's
fees, as contained in a contract,
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includes an allowance for legal
services rendered upon an appellate
review of an action growing out of the
instrument containing such provision.
In similar situations, some cases have
held that attorneys' fees should not be
allowed for successfully defending an
appeal. These decisions are based on
various grounds, i.e., that the
contract was mergea-Tn the judgment or
that the fees were not within the
contemplation of the parties. See
Ann., 52 A.L.R.Zd 863. However~he
majority view expressed in the more
recent cases allows such fees on
appeal. (Citations omitted). In our
opinion, these cases present the better
reasoned rule which we adopt.
The purpose of a provision for
attorneys' fees is to indemnify the
creditor or the prevailing party
against the necessity of paying an
attorney's fee and to enable him to
recover the full amount of the
obligation.
The appropriateness of modifying the rule of discretion in
this state so as to more readily award attorneys' fees on
appeal in the manner and under the circumstances just suggested
by the Colorado court has already been implicitly recognized by
this Court in Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592
P.Zd 620 (Utah 1979) wherein, at 625-26, it was stated:
The general rule on this point is that
attorneys' fees are not recoverable
unless allowed by statute or contracted
for by the parties unless, of course,
equity permits otherwise. (Footnotes
omitted).
In the instant action, the parties contracted for an award
of attorney's fees.

Accordingly, this case presents an

appropriate occasion for this Court to not only award
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respondent its attorney's fees incurred in

connecti~n

with this

appeal under the rule of discretion heretofore in effect in
this state, but also to modify that rule so as t'o make the
award of attorney's fees on appeal more a matter of course
where the contract enforced by the action on appeal provides
for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.

CONCLUSION
As the facts in this case show that the contract at issue
was both prima facie severable under the apportionability test
and meets the requirements of the essence of the contract test
in that it would have been entered into even for fewer than
eight lots, the finding of the trial court that the contract
was severable should be sustained and its judgment upheld.

As

this appeal taken by appellant has caused the respondent to
incur additional attorney's fees in its action to enforce the
contract, this Court should issue an order directing the trial
court to determine and award to respondent the reasonable
attorney's fees it incurred as a result of this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
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